Friday, 8 May 2009

CPU ramp up


This week, on monday 4th May, the capacity of the Computing Service at PIC suffered a substantial increase. The number of available cores almost doubled in one go, so now we have a total of about 1400 cores. This corresponds to the deployment of 90 new (blade) servers, the MoU-2009 purchase of the Tier-1.
These new Worker Nodes have a L5420 Intel Xeon processor, which should give us better power consumption to specs ratio. This figure is important these days, when input power issues appear everywhere you go.
The first thing we wanted to check when powering on this new capacity was how stable was the temperature inside the machine room, and it looks that this has been ok. The other interesting issue is to see how well the Torque and Maui servers scale when doubling the number of nodes. We will need to keep an eye also in the scaling of the CEs...

Thursday, 26 March 2009

February reliability, VOs joining the party

We should try and report about our scored availability and reliability for the past month of February... better before March is over!
Last month we got pretty good results for the OPS SAM tests: 98% availability (the missing 2% being basically the Scheduled Downtime on the 10th Feb) and... (drums in the background)... 100% reliability!
Yes. There we are, at the top of the ranking. Well, actually CERN, FNAL, BNL and RAL did also score max reliability last month, together with us.
Somebody might argue (the experiments, actually) that this are OPS VO tests, so not reflecting reality. Actually, the opposite was true since not long ago. The experiments SAM tests were still being put together, and they were showing lots of false negatives.
Anyway, the results for the VO-specific SAM tests in February were also pretty good at PIC: 98% reliability for ATLAS, 99% for CMS and 96% for LHCb. The ATLAS and CMS detected unreliability is completely true, we must admit. This was an indicent we suffered on the 22nd February (Sunday, by the way) with our "sword of damocles", also known as the SGM-dedicated WN. Some jobs hanged there, completely blocking further execution of the SGM jobs from the VOs. Luckily, Arnau reads his e-mail during weekends, and the problem was detected and solved quite fast (thanks!).
The LHCb reliability number is not really reliable, since their SAM test framework had some hickups the first 5 days of the month.
We had recently the WLCG Workshop in Prague, there we heard big complaints from CMS saying the reliability of Tier-1s is not good at all. The numbers they showed were indeed quite bad, and this is mostly due to the fact that they are adding extra ingredients to their reliability calculation. In particular, they use the results of routine dummy job submissions (JobRobot), and it happened that, even if our CMS SAMs were strong green, the JobRobot was more reddish.
I think it is good that experiments make their sites monitoring more sophisticated. However, for this to be a useful tool in improving reliability... they first need to tell us!
Now we are

Monday, 16 March 2009

CMS cpu consumer, back to business

Looks like someone in CMS was reading this blog, since few hours after the last post, saturday evening, CMS jobs started arriving to PIC. We see a constant load of about 300 jobs from CMS since then. Not bad.
Apparently these are the so-called "backfill" jobs. All the Tier-1s but us (and Taiwan, down these days due to a serious fire incident) started running these backfill jobs early March. After a bit of asking around, we found out that PIC was not getting its workload share because the old 32bit batch queue names were hardcoded somewhere in the CMS sytem (we deprecated 32bit queues more than one month ago!) plus they had a bug in the setup script that got the available TMPDIR space wrong.
Good that we found these problems and that they were promptly solved. Now CMS is back to the cpuburning business at PIC. ATLAS is still debugging the memory-exploding problem that stopped jobs being sent to PIC about one week ago. Looks we are close to the solution (missing packages) and we will soon se both experiments competing again for the CPU cycles at PIC.

Saturday, 14 March 2009

CPU delivery efficiency

We are these days collecting the accounting data for February 2009. Looks like we reached a record figure for CPU efficiency delivery last month. The 3 LHC experiments used up to 80% of the total CPU days available at PIC: almost 37.000 ksi2k·days. This was largely thanks to ATLAS, who consumed around 80% of those CPU days. LHCb used just above 15% and CMS a mere 5%.
So, well done for ATLAS. It is true that most of that load are not "Tier-1 type jobs", but just contribution to the experiment MonteCarlo production. Anyway, it is better that Tier-1 resources are used for simualation rather than stay idle consuming electricity, heating the computing room and watching their 3-year lifetime pass by (at a rate of about 6 kEur/month).
From our point of view the Panda system which is used in ATLAS, and that implements the now so-loved pull model for computing (or pilot jobs), is definetely doing a good job in consuming all available CPU resources.
Unfortunately, not everything is so nice. This last week we have seen the CPU utilisation at PIC decreasing quite a lot. The ATLAS Panda system was not sending jobs to PIC, and we discovered this was due to a problem with Athena software running in 64bit OS. Suddenly the production jobs running at PIC's SL4/64bit WNs exploded in memory utilisation and were eventually killed by the system. The experts are working now to understand and fix this, hope they find a patch soon.
Let's see when CMS and LHCb implement efficient CPU consuming systems similar to ATLAS and we can benefit of being a multi-experiment Tier-1.
Meanwhile, at PIC, idle CPUs are transforming electricity into heat. Waiting for ATLAS to cure their 64bit indigestion.

Friday, 27 February 2009

January availability, hit by CMS and cooling

So, let's try and have a look to the Tier-1 availability and reliability during the past month of January... at least before February is over!
The result for the reliability was 98%, just above the target for the Tier-1s (which is now 97%). This looks quite ok, but it is worth to note that our colleagues at the Tier-1s are doing a very good job at their sites, so with 98% we got the 8th position in the ranking, tied with TRIUMF. Four centres got the 100%, and three more got 99%. Quite impressive, isn't it?
Our 2% unreliability was mostly caused by the incident in the SRM service we had on January the 21st. On that day we saw our dCache SRM server flying in the sky with loads up to 300. The cause of that was traced to be a bug in the CMS jobs software, that made them issue recursive srmls queries to the SRM. Once again, we saw how easy is to suffer a DoS from an innocent user and how little we can do to protect us against it.
For the availability, however, we scored pretty low in January: 92%. Well below the 97% target. This was caused by the cooling indicent we suffered on saturday 24th January. After shutting down PIC on saturday noon, we did not bring it up back again until monday morning. Here we see how fast the availability goes down on weekends :-)
With the LHC start around the corner, we should be definetely operating our full 24x7 now. As we see we are not quite there yet, so now it is time to think about the last step in the 24x7 journey (one could call it MoD-Phase3) that implements the required coverage for the critical services. First thing to do: ensure we have a proper definition of criticality.

Friday, 6 February 2009

When the user becomes the enemy

Our poor SRM service has been the victim of a couple of user attacks in the last days. The user is always an inocent scientist somewhere trying to do some HEP research, but at some point starts hammering our SRM with requests which overload the system. It happened to us on the 21st January with CMS, whose jobs suddenly started issuing recursive srmls due to a bug. This overloaded our SRM service so that it could not handle other requests properly. Another event happened at the beginning of this week, when an ATLAS user from Germany started requesting a single file at PIC thousands of times. This was also traced to be a bug in the ATLAS Grid job framework. Even if innocent victims, we still need to protect against these events. And as of today there is no clear way on how to do it. We will need to work on splitting the SRM servers among VOs as well as being able to limit requests to the server in some way.

NFS, the batch killer, and the windy datacenter

Again, a long time since we do not post in this blog. This is not because nothing is going on here at PIC. On the contrary, too many things that let little time to write them down here.
Anyway, I will try now to briefly review the major issues we had in the last weeks. We had a couple of remarkable service problems. The first one, and most severe, affected the Computing service during Christmas. The problem started on the 19th December 2008, and it could not be fixed until the 12th January next year. The origin of the problem were LHCb and CMS jobs which were accessing to SQLite through NFS. This is known to be a bad practice since it can effectively hang the processes accessing NFS. This is what happened at PIC. The batch quickly filled up with hanged-unkillable jobs which in few days completely blocked the service. The batch master saw all of the WNs with high load, so could not deliver new jobs to run. We contacted back the experiments and asked them to stop using SQLite through NFS, but we also learnt useful lessons: we are missing very important monitoring.
The second problem arrived on saturday the 24th January around noon. There was a huge wind storm affecting the whole of Spain and the south of France. Among other incidences, this caused disruptions of the electric supply at the PIC building. The UPS system properly dealt with these short power cuts, but unfortunately the cooling system didn't. It stopped, and did not start back again automatically. The consequence was a fast temperature increase in the room. Fortunately, we could stop most of our servers gracefully so the restart on monday was quite smooth. In any case, more lessons learnt: more monitoring needed (a proper high level temperature alarm) and operational procedures in place, both for stopping the service asap and also for being able to start it back as soon as conditions are restablish. We should not forget we have to meet the MoU reliability metrics.